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Abstract
This paper presents a unied framework for characterizing symmetric equilibrium
in simultaneous move, two-player, rank-order contests with complete information, in
which each players strategy generates direct or indirect a¢ ne spillovere¤ects that
depend on the rank-order of her decision variable. These e¤ects arise in natural inter-
pretations of a number of important economic environments, as well as in classic con-
tests adapted to recent experimental and behavioral models where individuals exhibit
inequality aversion or regret. We provide the closed-form solution for the symmetric
Nash equilibria of this class of games, and show how it can be used to directly solve
for equilibrium behavior in auctions, pricing games, tournaments, R&D races, models
of litigation, and a host of other contests. Keywords: Contests; Auctions; Spillovers.
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1 Introduction
This paper presents a unied framework for analyzing equilibrium in simultaneous-move,
two-player, rank-order contests with complete information, in which each players strategy
generates direct or indirect a¢ ne spillover e¤ects that depend on the rank-order of her
decision variable. We show that these e¤ects arise in natural interpretations of a number of
important economic environments, including contests adapted to recent experimental and
behavioral models where individuals exhibit inequality aversion or regret. We provide a
characterization of symmetric equilibria (both pure and mixed), closed-form expressions for
these equilibria, and show how our results may be used to directly solve for equilibrium
behavior in auctions, pricing games, tournaments, R&D races, models of litigation, and a
host of other games.
Rank-order contests are ubiquitous. These take the form of environments in which play-
ers choose nonnegative bids (which may be interpreted as a proposed payment, e¤ort, or
the commitment of other scarce resources that are nonrefundable) whose rank-order dis-
continuously inuences the probability of winning some prize. Classic examples include
homogeneous product Bertrand competition (see Bertrand 1883), in which the lowest price
rm winsthe prot from selling to demand at that price, as well as rst and second-price
auctions (see Vickrey 1961), where the player who submits the highest bid wins the item and
pays either his own bid (in the rst-price auction) or the bid of the second-highest bidder
(in the second-price auction).
Winners and losers alike forfeit payments in many rank-order contests. In a rst-price
all-pay auction, for instance, each player submits a nonrefundable bid and only the higher
bidder receives a prize. The war-of-attrition (see Maynard Smith 1974) is a second-price
all-pay auction: The high bidder wins the prize and pays the amount bid by the second-
highest bidder. These forms of competition have been widely used to model activities as
diverse as patent and R&D races, lobbying and rent-seeking activities, litigation, advertising
and political campaigns, tournaments as incentive devices in labor markets, competition for
college admissions, sports competitions, urban architecture, and territorial contests among
organisms.1
1 Applications in these areas include work by Dasgupta (1986), Kaplan, Luski and Wettstein (2003),
Hillman and Riley (1989), Baye, Kovenock and de Vries (1993), Che and Gale (1998), Baye, Kovenock and
de Vries (2005), Sahuguet and Persico (2006), Konrad (2004), Fu (2006), Groh, Moldovanu, Sela and Sunde
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The principal motivation of this article is that spillovers are often important in rank-order
contests; in many economic environments, one players decision a¤ects the other players
payo¤, and the nature of this e¤ect may depend on the rank-order of the playerschoices.
This is perhaps most obvious in second-price auctions where the high bidder pays the second
highest bid, but spillovers also arise in a variety of economic contexts. For instance, an
extensive literature starting with DAspremont and Jacquemin (1988) has examined the
e¤ects of positive spillovers in R&D competition that can arise when one players R&D
e¤ort provides information that benets its rival. Although DAspremont and Jacquemin
(1988) does not involve rank-order e¤ects, a growing literature, starting from an original
observation by Dasgupta (1986), models the R&D process as a rank-order tournament (see
also Che and Gale 2003; Zhou 2006). The results examined in this article apply to the
positive spillovers arising in this context.
Rank-order spillovers also arise in models of litigation. Baye, Kovenock and de Vries
(2005), for instance, examine equilibrium in a litigation game with incomplete information
in which legal expenditures increase the quality of the case presented and where the best
casewins.2 This turns the litigation process into a rank order contest in which the litigation
incentives in legal systems, such as the American, British, Continental and Quaylesystems,
may be examined. Although the American system, where litigants pay their own legal costs,
involves no spillovers, other fee-shifting rules, such as the British and Continental rules,
which require that losers compensate winners for a portion of their legal costs, and the
Quayle system, in which the loser reimburses the winner up to the amount actually spent
by the loser, involve spillovers. Under the British and Continental rules there is a negative
indirect spillover e¤ect of the winners expenditure on the loser. In the continuation we call
this a second-order negative spillover e¤ect. In the case of the Quayle system, there is a
positive indirect spillover of the losers expenditure on the winner. We call this a rst-order
positive spillover e¤ect.
(forthcoming), Helsley and Strange (2008), and Kura (1999).
2Our analysis is also related to a number of papers that have examined other incomplete information
environments. Recent contributions include the analysis of crossholdings and nancial externalities (Das-
gupta and Tsui 2004; Ettinger 2003; Maasland and Onderstal 2007), k-double auctions (Kittsteiner 2003);
and charity auctions (Engers and McManus 2004; Goeree et al. 2005). Our paper is also related to the
literature on auctions with externalities dependent on the identity of the winner and not the bids per se (see,
for instance, Jehiel et al. 1996).
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Our taxonomy of spillover e¤ects may also be used to construct and analyze variants
and extensions of the auction and contest literatures noted above. For instance, the classic
partnership dissolution problem may be viewed as the auction of a business in which two
partners simultaneously submit bids and the partner with the higher bid pays his bid to the
partner with the lower bid in return for ownership of the business. In this case, the payment
of the winning partner is a second-order positive spillover e¤ect on the loser. Similarly, both
the rst-price and second-price all-pay auctions, often used to model economic and biological
contests, may be extended to include environments in which e¤ort expended imposes both
a rank-order contingent direct e¤ect on the player expending the e¤ort and a rank order
spillover e¤ect on the players rival. For instance, if two organisms are engaged in a territorial
ght, the e¤ort of the winner may exact both a cost to the winner (a rst-order negative
direct e¤ect) and a cost to the loser (a second-order negative spillover e¤ect). The losers
e¤ort may have a second-order negative direct e¤ect on the losers payo¤ and a rst-order
negative spillover e¤ect on the winner.
An important class of economic environments where rank-order dependent spillovers arise
naturally is the analysis of auctions adapted to recent experimental and behavioral models
of individual choice. In Section 3 we show that our characterization may be used to examine
behavioral models that include: (i) tournaments in which individuals exhibit inequality
aversion in the spirit of Fehr-Schmidt (1999), (ii) rst-price and all-pay auctions where players
experience regret similar to that in the models of Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1989), Engelbrecht-
Wiggans and Katok (2007), and Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay (2007), and (iii) an all-pay auction
in which players maximize relative tness according to the nite agent Evolutionary Stable
Strategies (ESS) equilibrium of Scha¤er (1988).3
Section 3 also shows that many pricing games have rank-order dependent spillovers that
may be analyzed within our framework. For instance, in a variant of the classic Bertrand
model due to Varian (1980), two sellers simultaneously set a price and sell to three inelastic
segments of demand with common choke price, r: One of these inelastic segments consists of
price-sensitive consumers who are aware of both prices in the market and who purchase from
the lower-price seller, while the other two segments are attached to di¤erent rms and are
each aware of only the price of that rm to which they are attached (as long as that price
3See also Hehenkamp, Leininger, and Possajennikov (2004) who, to the best of our knowledge, were the
rst to apply the ESS equilibrium concept in a (Tullock) contest.
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is at or below the choke price). Baye, Kovenock and de Vries (1992) have shown that this
game has a structure similar to that of a rst-price all-pay auction in which the bid is the
di¤erence between the choke price and a rms price. In this context, the bid corresponds to
the opportunity cost of the lost revenue from the sellers own uninformed segment that results
from reducing price in order to attempt to capture the prizeconsisting of the demand of
the informed price-sensitive consumer segment.
Spillovers also arise naturally in the context of the Varian model when one examines
popular price matching policies (see Lin 1988; Png and Hirshleifer 1987; Baye and Kovenock
1994). If a high-price seller institutes a price-matching policy, it will sell at its own price
to consumers informed only of that price, but sell at its rivals price to a proportion of
the informed customers who are willing to bear the cost of visiting the high-price seller
and taking it up on its o¤er to match the better price. In this case, the rivals low price
generates a spillover e¤ect on the high-price sellers payo¤, but not vice-versa. Section 3 also
includes additional applications of our results, including a reference pricingversion of the
Varian model that includes relative bargainseekers whose demand from the low-price rm
depends on the ratio of the high price to the low price. With reference pricing, a rivals high
price generates a spillover e¤ect on the low-price sellers payo¤, but not vice-versa.
All of these models have the property that they are special cases of the linear parameter-
ized class of rank-order contests whose symmetric equilibria we characterize in this paper.
In Section 2 we formally introduce this class of models and provide a general closed-form
solution for the symmetric equilibria of the class. We characterize the symmetric equilib-
rium strategies as functions of contest parameters,which when varied change the rules
of the contest. In Section 3, we show how this characterization may be used to directly ob-
tain closed-form solutions for symmetric equilibrium strategies in these and other economic
environments. In Section 4 we conclude. The proofs are collected in the Appendix.
2 Model and Results
We study the symmetric Nash equilibria of the class of two-player games of complete infor-
mation in which each player i 2 f1; 2g chooses an action (or bid) xi from the strategy space
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A = [0;1), and where payo¤s are
ui(xi; xj) =
8>><>>:
W (xi; xj)  v   xi   xj if xi > xj
L (xi; xj)      xi   xj if xi < xj
T (xi; xj)  12W (xi; xj) + 12L (xi; xj) if xi = xj
(1)
We assume that V  v+ > 0.4 We also assume that at least one of the contest parameters
, , , or  is nonzero.5 In the sequel, we let   denote an arbitrary game within this class.
The  and  parameters capture the externalities (negative or positive) that contestants
may inict on each other. We use the terms rst-order positive (negative) spillover e¤ects
when  < (>) 0; and second-order positive (negative) spillover e¤ectswhen  < (>) 0.
This captures the fact that when xi is the higher bid (the rst in rank-order), the spillover
e¤ect of player js bid, j 6= i; on player is payo¤ is linear with coe¢ cient  . If  > 0,
this e¤ect is negative and if  < 0 this e¤ect is positive. Likewise, when player is bid is the
lower bid (second in the rank-order), the spillover e¤ect of player js bid, j 6= i, is linear with
coe¢ cient  . If  > 0; this e¤ect is negative and if  < 0 this e¤ect is positive. For similar
reasons, we refer to  and  as the rst- and second-order direct e¤ects. If player is bid
(xi) is the higher bid, or rst, in the rank-order, the direct e¤ect of player is bid on player
is payo¤ is linear with coe¢ cient  : If  > 0; the rst-order direct e¤ect of an increase in
player is bid is negative; this e¤ect is positive if  < 0. Similar interpretations apply to the
second-order direct e¤ect, :
Notice that, were the strategy space bounded and one is merely interested in establishing
existence of a symmetric equilibrium, one could readily analyze this class of games using
the Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) framework. For games of incomplete information, Lizzeri
and Persico (2000) examine existence and uniqueness of bidding strategies in auctions where
W (xi; xj) and L (xi; xj) need not be linear, while Baye, Kovenock and de Vries (2005)
provide closed-form expressions for equilibrium strategies in the linear case. In what follows,
we provide closed-form solutions for symmetric pure- and mixed-strategy equilibria for the
case of complete information, and allow for parameter congurations not accounted for in
the Lizzeri-Persico and Baye-Kovenock-deVries analyses.6
4In particular, note that V > 0 implies W (0; 0) > L (0; 0) :
5The case where  =  =  =  = 0 corresponds to the game of pick the greatest nonnegative real
number,which does not have an equilibrium when the strategy space is unbounded.
6Complete information analogues of the Lizzeri-Persico axioms (labelled A1-A8) would require   0 (A5,
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2.1 Symmetric Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria
We rst provide the conditions under which there exists a symmetric pure strategy equilib-
rium, x; such that each player earns the equilibrium payo¤ U < 1. To this end, dene
   +       ; so that  measures the change in the payo¤ per unit of expenditure at
x derived solely from changes in the direct and spillover e¤ects (and not from winning V )
that result from the switch from being a loser to being a winner at x:
Proposition 1   has a symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibrium if and only if the following
three conditions jointly hold: (i)   0, (ii)   0 and (iii)  < 0. Furthermore, there is but
one such equilibrium and it is given by
x =  V

 v + 
 +       (2)
These conditions have intuitive interpretations:   0 means that, conditional on win-
ning, a players utility is nonincreasing in his own bid, and   0 means that, conditional
on losing, a players utility is nondecreasing in his own bid. The condition  < 0 roughly
means that in addition, the net spillover e¤ect (   ) is smallrelative to the net direct
e¤ect (  ).
Examples of applications of Proposition 1 to games of complete information include the
rst-price auction (  = 0,  = 1,  =  =  = 0) where x = v and the second-price auction
(  = 0,  = 1,  =  =  = 0) where x = v. Proposition 1 also implies that games such as
the standard rst-price all-pay auction ( =  = 1,  =  = 0) and the second-price all-pay
auction (also called the war of attrition, where  =  = 1,  =  = 0) do not have symmetric
pure-strategy equilibria. Since it is known that these special cases of   do have symmetric
mixed-strategy equilibria, we next provide a characterization of all such equilibria to  :
2.2 Symmetric Mixed-Strategy Equilibria
In the analysis that follows, a cumulative distribution function, F , is said to be a symmetric
mixed-strategy equilibrium of   (with associated equilibrium payo¤EU) if, for each player
i , for every xi in the support of F ; and for all x0i 2 [0;1) :
Ui (x
0
i; F ) 
Z 1
0
ui(x
0
i; xj)dF (xj) 
Z 1
0
ui(xi; xj)dF (xj)  Ui (xi; F ) = EU 2 ( 1;1)
A7),  > 0 (A7),   0 (A7), and  = 0 (A7). Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries assume, in their incomplete
information framework, that (; ) > 0;  = (1  ), and  = (1  ).
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Note that the existence of such an equilibrium requires that, for each xi 2 [0;1); ui(xi; xj)
be integrable with respect to the probability measure that induces F (xj); that is, conditional
expected utility exists and is nite.7 This formulation of symmetric mixed-strategy equilibria
permits us to deal with technical issues that can arise in games with unbounded strategy
spaces and payo¤s.8
It follows that if F is a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium with density f(x) on some
subset (m;u) of the support of F (so that there are no mass points in this interval), the
expected payo¤ to a player that bids w 2 (m;u) against the rivals mixed-strategy F is given
by
EU(w) =
Z w
0
W (w; x)dF (x) +
Z 1
w
L(w; x)dF (x)
Since F is a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium by hypothesis, EU(w) = EU on w 2
(m;u): Hence,
dEU(w)
dw
= [V + w] f(w)  + (  )F (w) = 0 (3)
on (m;u). The solution to this di¤erential equation is given by
F (w) =

  
(
1 

V + m
V + w
 

)
+ C

V + m
V + w
 

; (4)
where m  0 and 0  C  1:
Notice that this derivation of the functional form for a symmetric equilibrium mixed-
strategy is only heuristic, as it ignores mass points, the possibility of protable deviations
outside of (m;u) ; and furthermore, may not represent a well-dened distribution function
for some parameter congurations. Our next proposition addresses these issues formally and
characterizes the nondegenerate symmetric mixed-strategy equilibria to  .
Proposition 2   has a nondegenerate symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium if and only if
one of the following three sets of conditions holds: (i)  > 0 and  > 0; (ii)  = 0,  > 0
and either  = 0 or  < ; or (iii)  = 0;  < 0 and either  <  < 0 or  <  = 0:
7See, for instance, Chung (1974, p. 40) for a formal denition of integrability.
8The fact that F satises the above denition of an equilibrium does not imply that ui (xi; xj) is integrable
with respect to the the joint probability measure induced by F because E [ui (xi; xj)] may not exist. Note
that if E [ui (xi; xj)] exists, it equals EU; if it does not exist, F is nonetheless an equilibrium in the sense
that any given xi drawn from F and assigned to player i is a best response to F provided player i knows
this realization, but not the realization assigned to his rival.
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In cases (i) and (ii), the equilibrium is unique within the class of symmetric equilibria (pure
or mixed). In case (iii) there exists a continuum of nondegenerate symmetric mixed-strategy
equilibria, as well as a unique symmetric pure strategy equilibrium (given in Proposition 1).
The nondegenerate symmetric mixed-strategy equilibria are atomless and described by the
distribution function F  (w) on [m; u); where
F  (w) =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:

 

1 

V+m
V+w
 


if  6= 0; 6= 

  ln

V+( )w
V

if  6= 0; = 

 
 
1  exp    
V
w

if  = 0; 6= 

V
w if  = 0; = 
; (5)
m =
8<: 0 if  > 0m0 2  V

;1

if  < 0
; and (6)
u =
8>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>:
 V

if  > 0;  = 0;  < 0
V

h
(=)

    1
i
if  > 0;  > 0; 6= ;  6= 0
V

[exp (=)  1] if  =  > 0;  6= 0
V
  ln


if  > 0;  > 0; 6= ;  = 0
V= if  > 0;  > 0; = ;  = 0
1 if otherwise
Furthermore, the corresponding equilibrium payo¤s are given by
EU =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
v+
  + 

( )

1 



 
 

V if  6= 0; 6= ;  6= ;  6= 0
  + V

  V



ln 

if  6= 0; 6= ;  = ;  6= 0
v+
  +

 m
 if  6= 0; 6= ;  6= 0;  = 0
    m if  6= 0; 6= ;  = 0;  = 0
v+
  + 

( )2
h
1  exp

 

i
V if  6= 0; = 
v+
  + 

( )2
h
ln



i
V if  = 0; 6= ;  6= 0
v+
  if  = 0; 6= ;  = 0
    
2
V if  = 0; = 
(7)
Notice that all of the terms in equations (5), (6) and (7) are well-dened, since conditions
(i) through (iii), which guarantee the existence of a nondegenerate symmetric mixed-strategy
equilibrium, imply: (a)  6= 0; (b) if  < 0; then  < 0 and  = 0; (c) if  = ; then  > 0
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and  > 0; (d) if  =  and  6= 0; then  6= ; (e) if  6=  and  = 0; then  6= ; and (f) if
 6= 0 then  > 0 and  > 0:
The Appendix constructively derives all of the possible symmetric equilibria and the
resulting payo¤s in a series of lemmata, and also indicates when an equilibrium does not
exist. The analysis in the Appendix implies that one may also obtain closed-form expressions
for the equilibrium strategies by taking limits of equation (4). For instance, the functional
form for the equilibrium distribution function in Proposition 2 when  6= 0 and  =  obtains
by taking the limit of equation (4) as    tends to zero.
Propositions 1 and 2, which characterize the parameter ranges where symmetric pure
and nondegenerate mixed-strategy equilibria arise, together facilitate a complete partition
of the parameter space into ranges of qualitatively di¤erent symmetric Nash equilibrium
correspondences. We summarize this in
Proposition 3 The symmetric equilibria to   are characterized as follows:
(a) The unique symmetric equilibrium is in pure strategies if and only if one of the
following three conditions holds: (i)  > 0;   0; and  < 0; (ii)  = 0;  = 0; and  < 0;
or (iii)  = 0;    < 0; and  6= 0.
(b) The unique symmetric equilibrium is in nondegenerate mixed strategies if and only
one of the following two conditions holds: (i)  > 0 and  > 0; or (ii)  = 0,  > 0 and
either  = 0 or  < .
(c) There is a unique symmetric pure strategy equilibrium and a continuum of nondegen-
erate symmetric mixed-strategy equilibria if and only if  = 0;  < 0 and either  <  < 0
or  <  = 0:
Furthermore, if none of the conditions in (a) through (c) hold,   does not have a sym-
metric equilibrium (either pure or mixed).
It is important to emphasize that we have focused solely on symmetric equilibria. Asym-
metric equilibria are known to exist, for instance, in the symmetric two player war of attrition
( =  = 1;  =  = 0) and sad loser auction ( = 1;  =  =  = 0): We also note that,
were there a common nite upper bound on the strategy space for the players (such that the
strategy space is compact), existence of a symmetric equilibrium is guaranteed by Lemma 7
of Dasgupta-Maskin (1986).9
9As a referee noted, extending our analysis to include a common nite upper bound on the strategy space
10
Before proceeding, we o¤er several observations about the four functional forms for the
symmetric equilibrium mixed-strategies that can arise under di¤erent parameter congura-
tions. First, note that the lower bound of the support, m, of every symmetric equilibrium
mixed-strategy to   is zero when  > 0; but an arbitrary positive number m 2 ( V=;1)
when  < 0 (this accounts for the continuum of symmetric mixed-strategy equilibria that
arise in this case). Second, notice that the equilibrium mixed-strategies take on di¤erent
functional forms (including the uniform distribution, exponential distribution, as well as
more exotic forms) depending on which of four regions (denoted R1-R4) the parameters lie:
R1:  6= 0 and  6= : In this case, any of the conditions (i), (ii), or (iii) in Proposition 2
may apply. This is, in a sense, the most general form of an all pay auction in which
direct e¤ects are asymmetric and spillovers may be either symmetric or asymmetric.
When both  and  are positive, Proposition 2 implies that the support of the dis-
tribution is bounded. When  = 0, the support of the symmetric equilibrium mixed
strategies is unbounded unless  < 0; the unbounded distribution is known as a Burr
distribution with a Pareto type upper tail such that not all moments exist. Notice
that part (ii) of Proposition 2 includes the case where  = 0,  > 0, and  = 0:
The Riley and Samuelson (1980) sad loser auction in which only the loser pays his bid
( =  =  = 0 and  = 1) is a special case of this conguration. The case where
 = 0;  > 0 and  >  6= 0 may be viewed as a sad loser auction with spillovers
( >  ). Finally, note that when  <  = 0 and either  <  < 0 or  <  = 0; there
is a continuum of symmetric mixed-strategy equilibria which stem from the continuum
of lower bounds for the support that arise when  < 0. The Baye-Morgan (1999)
folk-theorem for one-shot, homogeneous product Bertrand games, which entails both a
continuum of symmetric equilibrium strategies and equilibrium payo¤s, is an example
of an economic environment that may be viewed as a   with parameters in R1.
R2:  6= 0 and  = . In this case, conditions (i) through (iii) in Proposition 2 imply that
only condition (i) is satised, and therefore  =  > 0 and  6= . In this case the
asymmetric spillovers impact both the equilibrium payo¤s and the symmetric mixed
strategies (which take on a logarithmic form). To the best of our knowledge, contests
would permit one to analyze games (such as the Travelers Dilemma; see Basu 1994) that have payo¤s as in
equation (1) but are not covered in our framework because of the strategy space restriction.
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or auctions with parameters in R2 have not here-to-for been examined in the literature.
Games with parameters in R2 may be interpreted as a generalized rst-price all-pay
auction with asymmetric spillovers.
R3:  = 0 and  6= : In this case, conditions (i) through (iii) in Proposition 2 imply
that either (i) or (ii) applies, and therefore  > 0,   0 and  6= . In this case the
asymmetric spillovers impact the symmetric equilibrium payo¤s but not the equilibrium
mixed-strategies (which take the form of a truncated exponential distribution). The
standard war of attrition ( =  = 1,  =  = 0) is a special case of a   with
parameters in R3. Notice that when  > 0, the symmetric mixed-strategy has a
bounded upper support, whereas it is unbounded when  = 0 (and hence the symmetric
mixed-strategies are a nontruncated exponential distribution).
R4:  = 0 and  = . In this case, conditions (i) through (iii) in Proposition 2 imply that
only condition (i) can be satised, and therefore  =  > 0 and  = . The standard
all-pay auction ( =  = 1 and  =  = 0) is a special case of this conguration. More
generally, this conguration is a modied rst-price all-pay auction in which  =  6= 0
is a nuisance parameter that does not inuence the symmetric equilibrium mixed-
strategy (which is a uniform distribution) but does impact the players equilibrium
expected payo¤s. Notice that a game with parameters in R4 is the limit of games with
parameters in R2 as the spillovers become symmetric.
3 Applications
We now are in a position to show how our characterization of symmetric equilibria may be
used to obtain closed-form expressions for equilibrium strategies in economic environments
that include auctions, contests, and pricing games. In so doing, we also show that our
results may be used to generalize existing models to allow for spillover e¤ects, and to exam-
ine the implications of alternative behavioral and evolutionary assumptions on equilibrium.
Throughout this section, we suppress ties, which we assume are broken with the ip of a fair
coin.
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3.1 Auctions and Contests with Spillovers
In addition to standard auctions and contests (such as rst- and second-price auctions,
the war of attrition, and the all-pay auction), our framework may be used to characterize
symmetric equilibria in more exotic economic applications.
Partnership Dissolution (The Self-Auction). Two partners wish to dissolve a part-
nership each values at v > 0. They simultaneously submit bids; the high bidder wins the
asset and pays his bid to the other partner. Here, the payo¤s are given by
ui (xi; xj) =
8<: v   xi if xi > xjxj if xi < xj
and thus the game may be viewed as a   with V = v;  =   = 1;  =  = 0; and  =  2:
It follows from Proposition 1 that the only symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium is x = v=2.
Furthermore, Proposition 3 reveals that the self-auction does not have a nondegenerate
symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium.
An Innovation Contest with Spillovers. One may also use our results to extend Das-
guptas (1986) all-pay auction formulation of an R&D race by allowing each rms expen-
diture on R&D to induce an informational spillover that benets the rival. In particular,
suppose the winner receives a greater benet per unit of expenditure from the losers ex-
penditure than the loser receives from the winners expenditure. The corresponding payo¤s
are
ui (xi; xj) =
8<: v   xi   xj if xi > xj xi   xj if xi < xj
This game may be viewed as a   in which V = v > 0,  =  = 1, and  <  < 0: Since
    = 0 and  > 0; Propositions 2 and 3 imply that the unique symmetric equilibrium is
in nondegenerate mixed strategies (with parameters in R2) and is given by
F  (x) =
1
    ln

1 +
   
v
x

on

0;
v
   

exp

   


  1

Territorial Contests with Injuries. Next, consider a generalization of an all-pay auction
formulation of a territorial contest in which the outcome of the battle depends on the intensity
of e¤ort put forth by the two players in the ght, where each player values the territory in
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dispute at v > 0. Suppose the cost to a player per unit of intensity of e¤ort is unity
( =  = 1), and each unit of e¤ort a player expends in the battle imposes a cost on its
rival (through injury), so that ,  > 0: If the cost to the loser per unit of intensity of e¤ort
of the winner is greater than the cost to the winner per unit of intensity of e¤ort of the loser
( >  > 0), then     = 0 and  =     > 0: In this case, Proposition 2 reveals that the
symmetric equilibrium of this game is identical to that in the above innovation contest with
spillovers.
If, on the other hand, the e¤orts of the winner and loser entail symmetric injury ( =  >
0), Proposition 2 implies that the symmetric equilibrium mixed-strategy (with parameters
in R4) is given by
F  (x) = x=v on [0; v] ;
which corresponds to the all-pay auction. However, expected payo¤s are not zero (as they
are in the standard all-pay auction). Notice that, as a result of spillovers, both of these
variants di¤er from the classic war of attrition ( =  = 0 and  =  = 1), which lies in the
region of R3 that entails an equilibrium distribution that is an exponential distribution.
Litigation Contests with Fee Shifting. Our framework may also be used to characterize
symmetric equilibria for the complete information analogues of the Baye et al. (2005) model
of litigation contests under incomplete information. In this application, players are litigants
who compete by choosing (quality normalized) expenditures on legal services, with the player
spending the higher amount winning the case valued at v > 0. The fee shifting rules examined
by Baye et al. may be examined under complete information using the tools developed in
Section 2.
For instance, under the Continental rule, the loser pays his own legal expenditure and, ad-
ditionally, reimburses the winner a fraction (1 ) 2 (0; 1) of the winners legal expenditures.
Thus, the Continental rule is a   with V = v, 0 <  <  = 1; and  = 0 <  = (1 ): Since
 > 0;  > 0;   > 0, and  = 2(1 ) > 0, Proposition 2 implies that the corresponding
equilibrium (with parameters in R1) is
F (x) =
1
1  
 
1 

v
v + 2(1  )x
 1
2
!
on

0;
v
2 (1  )

1
2
  1

and the equilibrium payo¤ is EU =  v (1  ) = (2) < 0.
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In contrast, under the Quayle rule, where the loser reimburses the winner up to the
amount actually spent by the loser, V = v,  = 2,  = 1,  =  1 and  = 0. Since  > 0;
 > 0;     > 0 and  = 2 > 0; Proposition 2 implies that the corresponding equilibrium
(with parameters in R1) is
F (x) = 2
"
1 

v
v + 2x
 1
2
#
on

0;
3
2
v

and the equilibrium payo¤ is EU = 0. Furthermore, Proposition 1 reveals that symmetric
pure-strategy equilibria do not arise in these litigation environments.
3.2 Price Competition
We mentioned earlier that our framework readily includes standard models of price competi-
tion under complete information that take the form of rst- and second-price auctions (which
have a unique symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies) as well variants that have symmetric
mixed-strategy equilibria. We next show that our framework also subsumes several models
of price competition in the industrial organization literature.
Bertrand Competition. Our framework may be used to identify all symmetric equilibria
in winner-take-all homogeneous product Bertrand games, including the unique symmetric
pure-strategy equilibrium (marginal cost pricing) and the continuum of positive-prot mixed
strategy equilibria identied by Baye and Morgan (1999). To see this, suppose two price-
setting rms produce a homogeneous product at a constant marginal cost, c > 0, and the
rm o¤ering the lowest price captures the entire market demand, which is given by D (p) = 1
for p 2 [0;1). Thus, the prots of rm i are given by
i (pi; pj) =
8<: 0 if pi > pjpi   c if pi < pj
Letting xi  pi, this is a   with V = c;  =  1 ;  =  =  = 0, and  =  1: By
Proposition 1 , x  p =  V= = c is the unique symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibrium
(and each rm earns zero prots). By Proposition 2, there is also a continuum of symmetric
positive prot equilibria in nondegenerate mixed strategies (with parameters in R1): For
every m 2 (c;1),
F  (p) = 1 

m  c
p  c

on [m;1)
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is a symmetric nondegenerate mixed-strategy equilibrium with corresponding equilibrium
payo¤s of EU = m 2 (c;1).
The Varian/Rosenthal Model. The price setting models of Varian (1980) and Rosenthal
(1980) may be analyzed in our framework as follows. Here, two price-setting rms each
service a xed number, L > 0; of loyal (or uninformed) consumers who have unit demand up
to a choke price , r > 0: Additionally, there are S > 0 price sensitive shoppers(or informed
consumers) who always purchase from the rm charging the lowest price provided it does
not exceed r. Each rm produces at zero cost to earn a payo¤ of
i (pi; pj) =
8<: (S + L) pi if pi < pjLpi if pi > pj
where, for simplicity we have suppressed the fact that a rms prots are zero if it prices
above r:
To see that this model is a special case of our framework, dene xi  r   pi  0 so that
the above payo¤s are equivalent to those in a game in which
ui (xi; xj) =
8<: (S + L) r   (S + L)xi if xi > xjrL  Lxi if xi < xj
Thus, the Varian/Rosenthal models may be interpreted as a   with v = (S + L) r,  =  rL,
V = rS > 0,  = (S + L) > 0,  =  = 0,  = L > 0; and  =  S < 0:10 Hence, by
Proposition 2, the equilibrium (expressed in terms of the discount from the monopoly price,
or x  r   p) is associated with parameters in R1 and is given by
F  (x) =
L
S

r
r   x   1

on

0;
rS
S + L

To write this expression in terms of the equilibrium distribution of prices, G (p), use the
fact that x  r  p and note that G (p) = Pr (P  p) = 1 Pr (x < r   p) = 1 F  (r   p),
so that
G (p) = 1  L
S

r   p
p

on

r
L
S + L
; r

10Application of our Propositions also requires the strategy space in the transformed game to be [0;1).
Notice that xi 2 [0;1) implies pi 2 ( 1; r]. It is immediate that negative prices are strictly dominated.
Hence, expanding the strategy space in the original game to include negative prices does not change the
equilibrium set.
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PriceMatching Guarantees. One may also use our results to extend the Varian/Rosenthal
models to allow for price matching policies, as in Png and Hirshleifer (1987) and Baye and
Kovenock (1994). To see this, extend the Varian/Rosenthal models by assuming that the
two rms not only list prices, but also promise to match a better price by the rival. Here,
one interprets S as informed consumers who are aware of the rmsprices, L as uninformed
consumers who are unaware of the rmsprices, and one assumes that only a proportion
 < 1=2 of the informed customers are willing to bear the cost of visiting a rm charging
the highest price to take it up on its o¤er to match a better price. Consequently, the rms
payo¤s are
i (pi; pj) =
8<: (L+ (1  )S) pi if pi < pjLpi + Spj if pi > pj
As before, let xi = r   pi, so that the payo¤s may be rewritten as
ui (xi; xj) =
8<: r ((1  )S + L)  ((1  )S + L)xi if xi > xjr (L+ S)  Lxi   Sxj if xi < xj
Note that V = (1  2)Sr > 0;  = (1  )S + L > 0;  = L > 0;  = S > 0; and  = 0:
In this case,     =   (1  )S < 0 and  =   (1  2)S < 0, and the parameters lie in
R1. Proposition 2 implies
F  (x) =
L
(1  )S
 
r
r   x
 (1 )
(1 2)
  1
!
on
"
0; r
 
1 

L
((1  )S + L)
 (1 2)
(1 )
!#
As before, one may easily re-write this distribution of discounts from the monopoly price
purely in terms of the prices.
3.3 Behavioral and Evolutionary Extensions
The results in Section 2 may also be used to extend existing models to account for behavioral
or evolutionary considerations that impact the payo¤s in standard games. We discuss these
applications next.
Reference Pricing. One may use our results to analyze an extension of the Varian/Rosenthal
models to account for reference pricing. To see this, suppose that in addition to shoppers
and loyal consumers, there also exists a measure of relative bargain seekers.As above,
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all consumer segments have a common choke price, r > 0: Relative bargain seekers, like
shoppers, always purchase from the rm o¤ering the lowest price. But unlike shoppers, the
demand of relative bargain seekers depends on how low the best price is in comparison to the
next best price: The lower the bestprice relative to that of the higher price, the greater
their demand for the low-priced good. To capture this behavior, assume that when rm i
charges the lowest price, its demand from relative bargain seekers is Di  pj=pi while rm
js demand from these consumers is zero. When  > 0, this captures the behavioral phe-
nomenon where the demand by one segment of consumers depends, in part, on their frame
of reference.
With this extension, the payo¤s are.
i (pi; pj) =
8<:

S + L+ 
pj
pi

pi if pi < pj
Lpi if pi > pj
As before, let xi  r   pi; so that these payo¤s are equivalent to
ui (xi; xj) =
8<: r (S + L+ )  xi (S + L)  xj if xi > xjrL  Lxi if xi < xj
If   L, this extension may be viewed as a   with V = r (S + ) > 0;  = L > 0;
 = S + L > 0;  = 0;  = ;     =  S < 0 and  =   (S + ) < 0:11 These parameters
lie in R1, and Proposition 2 implies
F  (x) =
L
S
 
r
r   x
 S
S+
  1
!
on
"
0; r
 
1 

L
S + L
 (S+)
S
!#
;
or in terms of price,
G (p) = 1  L
S
 
r
p
 S
S+
  1
!
on
"
r

L
S + L
 (S+)
S
; r
#
This distribution converges to that in the Varian/Rosenthal model as  tends to zero.
Interestingly, when there are only loyal customers and relative bargain seekers (S = 0),
then  =   < 0 and     = 0. In this case the parameters lie in R2, and Proposition 2
implies
F  (x) =
L

ln
r
r   x on

0;

1  exp

 
L

r

11Notice that xi 2 [0;1) implies pi 2 ( 1; r]. If   L ; it is immediate that negative prices are strictly
dominated. Hence, expanding the strategy space in the original game to include negative prices does not
change the equilibrium set.
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E¤ort Inequality Aversion in a Job Tournament. Next, consider an environment
where two workers compete in a job tournament but exhibit a specialized form of inequality
aversion such that they receive disutility from inequality of e¤ort. We model inequality
aversion with a utility function similar to that in Fehr-Schmidt (1999), except that our focus
is on e¤ort inequality rather than income inequality.
In particular, suppose that the worker exerting the greater e¤ort (xi) receives a bonus
valued at  > 0 and that payo¤s are
ui (xi; xj) =
8<:   xi   b (xi   xj) if xi > xj xi   a (xj   xi) if xi < xj
where 0 < a < 1 and 0 < b. This captures behavior where the winner experiences disutility
for having slaughteredthe loser, and the loser derived disutility from having been beaten
badly. In this case, utilities may be written as
ui (x1; x2) =
8<:   (1 + b)xi + bxj if xi > xj  (1  a)xi   axj if xi < xj
This behavioral environment may thus be viewed as a   in which V = v =  > 0;  = 0;
 = 1  a > 0;  = a;  = 1 + b > 0 and  =  b < 0: Note that    =   (a+ b) < 0 and
 = 0.
Since  = 1   a > 0, it is immediate from Proposition 1 that there does not exist a
symmetric pure strategy equilibrium. However, Propositions 2 and 3 imply that a unique
nondegenerate symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium (with parameters in R3) exists. The
corresponding distribution of e¤ort is
F  (x) =
1  a
a+ b

exp

a+ b

x

  1

on

0;

a+ b
ln

1 + b
1  a

and each player earns an expected equilibrium payo¤ of
EU =
a
a+ b

1 +
1 + b
a+ b
ln

1  a
1 + b


It is interesting to note that if a 2 (0; 1) but b 2 ( 1; 0) (so that the winner enjoys
slaughteringthe loser), the equilibrium strategies and payo¤s have exactly the same form
when b 6=  a. But when b =  a (so that     = 0 and  = 0), the parameters lie in R4
and the equilibrium distribution e¤ort is identical to that in the all-pay auction:
F  (x) =
1  a

x on

0;

1  a

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However, unlike the all-pay auction,
EU =   a
2 (1  a):
Loss Aversion in a Job Tournament. Two workers compete in a job tournament and
the worker exerting the greater e¤ort (xi) receives a bonus valued at  > 0. Thus, their
income is
yi =
8<:   xi if xi > xj xi if xi < xj
Suppose the workersutility (over income) exhibits loss aversionin that ui = yi if player i
wins, and ui = yi if player i loses, where  > 1: In this case, utility (as a function of e¤ort)
is
ui (xi; xj) =
8<:   xi if xi > xj xi if xi < xj
and this scenario may be analyzed as a   with v = ;  = 0; V =  > 0;  =  > 0;
 = 1 > 0;  =  = 0; and  =     =   1 > 0: Hence, Propositions 2 and 3 imply that
the unique nondegenerate symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium (with parameters in R1) is
given by
F  (x) =
x
+ (  1)x on [0; ]
Regret in Auctions. A growing literature has examined regret in auctions; see Engelbrecht-
Wiggans (1989), Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok (2007), and Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay (2007)
and the references cited therein. To illustrate how our framework may be used to examine
the implications of this behavioral assumption in complete information environments, con-
sider a rst-price auction where each player i 2 f1; 2g values the item at v; but there is
winner regret such that the payo¤s are
ui(x1; x2) =
8<: v   xi    (xi   xj) if xi > xj0 if xi < xj
Here, xi is player is bid and v > 0 is the value of the item; winner regret ( > 0) refers to the
fact that the high bidder derives disutility from leaving money on the table (the di¤erence
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between the winning and losing bid). The payo¤s may be rewritten as
ui(x1; x2) =
8<: v   (+ 1) xi + xj if xi > xj0 if xi < xj
which is a rank-order contest,  , with a positive rst-order spillover e¤ects. In particular,
V = v,  =  = 0;  = (1 + ) > 0;  =  ; and  =  1; so Proposition 1 implies that a
symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists and is given by x = v. Furthermore, by
Proposition 3, there are no symmetric mixed-strategy equilibria.
In a rst-price auction with loser regret, payo¤s are
ui(x1; x2) =
8<: v   xi if xi > xj  (v   xj) if xi < xj
where  > 0: Preferences with loser regret thus transform the standard auction into a rank-
order contest with a positive second-order spillover e¤ect, and one can use the results in
Section 2 to conclude that the unique symmetric equilibrium (pure or mixed) is x = v.
The results of Section 2 may also be used to extend these behavioral models to include
combined winner and loser regret in a rst-price auction. In this case, both rst and second
order spillover e¤ects arise, as the payo¤s are
ui(x1; x2) =
8<: v   (+ 1) xi + xj if xi > xj  (v   xj) if xi < xj
One can readily establish that the unique symmetric equilibrium is in pure strategies and is
given by x = v.
Furthermore, our results may be utilized to examine the implications of combined winner-
loser regret in other auction environments. For instance, in an all-pay auction with winner-
loser regret, payo¤s are
ui(x1; x2) =
8<: v   (+ 1) xi + xj if xi > xj v  (+ 1) xi + xj if xi < xj
This may be viewed as a   in which V = (1 + ) v;  = (1 + ) > 0;  = (1 + ) > 0;
 =  ;  =  ; and  = 0: When  6= , Propositions 2 and 3 imply that the unique
symmetric equilibrium (with parameters in R3) is
F (x) =

1 + 
  

1  exp

   
1 + 
x
v

on

0;
1  
    ln

1 + 
1 + 

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and each player earns an expected payo¤ of
EU = v+  (1 + ) v
(1 + ) ln 1+
1+
+   
(  )2
However, if  = , so that  = , one obtains the standard all-pay auction form (with para-
meters in R4): F  (x) = x=v: In this case, total expected e¤ort is the same with symmetric
winner-loser regret as in the standard all-pay auction, but EU =  v=2.
ESS in the All-Pay Auction. Finally, one may utilize our results to construct equilibrium
strategies in certain evolutionary environments. To see this, consider a two player all-pay
auction and note that the (nite agent) ESS equilibrium of Scha¤er (1988) requires that each
player maximizes the di¤erence in payo¤s. Thus
ui(x1; x2) =
8<: v   xi   ( xj) if xi > xj xi   (v   xj) if xi < xj
Hence, this may be viewed as a   where payo¤s are
ui(x1; x2) =
8<: v   xi + xj if xi > xj v   xi + xj if xi < xj
and V = 2v > 0,  =  =   =   = 1; and consequently,   = 0 and  = 0: Notice that
these parameters lie in R4. One may therefore apply the results in Section 2 to conclude that
the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium to a game with these payo¤s (which corresponds to
the ESS equilibrium of a game with the original formulation of payo¤s) is
F (x) =
x
2v
on [0; 2v]
Among other things, this implies that there is overdissipation of rents in the ESS equilibrium.
This is similar to the ndings of Hehenkamp et al. (2004) for the case of a Tullock contest.
4 Conclusion
This paper has characterized symmetric equilibria (pure and mixed) in a parameterized class
of two player complete information contests with rank-order spillovers. We derived explicit
closed form solutions for the complete set of symmetric equilibrium strategies for this class
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of games, and showed that these strategies take on only a small number of functional forms
that depend on the parameters in a systematic and easily veried way. We concluded by
using this framework to formulate and solve several new contests. Not only are a plethora
of existing models of auctions, contests, and price competition covered as special cases, but
our results permit one to extend these models to allow for a broader array of preferences,
spillover e¤ects, and equilibrium concepts. The logarithmic equilibrium distribution that
arises in the all-pay auction with asymmetric spillovers, for example, appears to be novel
to the literature. We believe that Propositions 1 through 3 will provide positive spillovers
for future applied work on auctions, contests, and pricing strategies, as well as behavioral
economics and evolutionary game theory.
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Appendix
This Appendix provides the proofs of Propositions 1 through 3. Recall the denitions of
W , L, and T are given in equation (1) :
A1. Proof of Proposition 1
The following lemma is useful in proving Proposition 1.
Lemma 1 x 2 [0;1) is a symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibrium of   if and only if the
following two conditions hold:
T (x; x)  W (y; x) for all y  x (8)
T (x; x)  L (y; x) for all 0  y  x
Proof. Recall that x1 = x2 = x is a symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibrium if and
only if ui (x; x)  ui (y; x) for all y 2 [0;1): Note that ui (y; x) = L (y; x) for y < x and
ui (y; x) =W (y; x) for y > x. Additionally, since
ui (x; x) = T (x; x) =
1
2
W (x; x) +
1
2
L (x; x)
the conditions in (8) imply
ui (x; x) = T (x; x) =W (x; x) = L (x; x)
((= ) By hypothesis, x 2 [0;1) satises
T (x; x)  W (y; x) for all y  x
T (x; x)  L (y; x) for all y  x
Hence, if player i plays the pure strategy xi = x when player j plays xj = x; she earns a
payo¤ of U = T (x; x) = W (x; x) = L (x; x) : The conditions in (8) imply that player i
cannot gain by deviating from x, given that xj = x.
( =) ) If (x; x) is a symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibrium, player i earns a payo¤ of
T (x; x) in this equilibrium. By way of contradiction, suppose there exists a y 2 [0;1) such
that y > x with T (x; x) < W (y; x). Then player i could increase his payo¤ to W (y; x) >
T (x; x) by deviating from xi = x to xi = y, a contradiction. Similarly, if there existed a
y 2 [0;1) such that y < x with T (x; x) < L (y; x), player i could increase his payo¤ to
L (y; x) > T (x; x) by deviating from xi = x to xi = y, a contradiction.
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We conclude that the conditions in (8) are necessary and su¢ cient for the existence of
a symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Note that the proof of Lemma 1 does not
rely on the linear structure for W and L in equation (1), and hence applies to more general
formulations for payo¤s.
We are now in a position to prove Proposition 1. We do so by exploiting the linear
structure in equation (1) and applying Lemma 1.
Proof of Proposition 1. (=)) By way of contradiction, suppose x 2 [0;1) is a
symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibrium so that player i earns his equilibrium payo¤
of U = T (x; x) = W (x; x) = L (x; x) at (x; x). If condition (i) in Proposition 1 did
not hold, then player i could deviate to earn W (x+ "; x) > U = W (x; x), since  <
0 implies W (xi; x) is increasing in xi, a contradiction. If condition (iii) did not hold,
then V + x = W (x; x)   L (x; x) > 0; which contradicts the conditions in (8) : Finally,
since V > 0; condition (iii) implies x > 0: Thus, if condition (ii) did not hold, then
x > 0 and  > 0, in which case player i could deviate to earn a payo¤ of L (x  "; x) >
L (x; x) = W (x; x) = U; since  > 0 implies L (xi; x) is decreasing in xi, a contradiction.
((=) Suppose conditions (i) through (iii) hold. It is immediate that condition (iii) im-
plies that x =  V= is well-dened and V + x = W (x; x)   L (x; x) = 0. Hence,
W (x; x) = L (x; x) = T (x; x). Next, note that there is no incentive to deviate from x;
since (i) implies T (x; x)  W (y; x) for all y  x, and (ii) implies T (x; x)  L (y; x)
for all y  x. By the Lemma 1, this implies that x is a symmetric pure strategy Nash
equilibrium. Uniqueness follows from Lemma 1 and the fact that x =  V= is the unique
solution to W (x; x)  L (x; x) = 0:
A2. Proof of Proposition 2
Our second proposition is proved through a sequence of lemmas. We rst demonstrate
that if an atom exists at some point (x; x) in a nondegenerate symmetric mixed-strategy
equilibrium of  ; then (x; x) constitutes a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium as well.
We then apply Proposition 1 to show that this can occur only over a restricted range of
the parameter space and that any such atom is unique. Consequently, if the symmetric
equilibrium is in nondegenerate mixed strategies, there must exist an absolutely continuous
part of the mixed-strategy, and furthermore, it must satisfy the di¤erential equation in
equation (3). Given the linearity of di¤erential equation (3), it readily follows that its solution
over the interval (m;u) is unique (as it satises a Lipschitz condition). Lemma 4 provides an
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endpoint restriction on the lower bound of the distribution. We then examine (by exhaustion)
a partition of the parameter space to show (i) when the di¤erential equation can be solved in
a manner consistent with the corresponding restrictions on mass points and endpoints, (ii)
which solutions indeed dene equilibria in the sense that there is no incentive for a player to
unilaterally deviate from his strategy, and (iii) whether the di¤erential equation, mass point
and endpoint restrictions are inconsistent, thereby implying nonexistence of a nondegenerate
symmetric mixed-strategy. We also derive the corresponding equilibrium payo¤s.
Lemma 2 If there is an atom at some point x 2 [0;1) in a nondegenerate symmetric
mixed-strategy equilibrium of  , then (x; x) is also a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium of
 . Furthermore, there is no atom at x = 0.
Proof. If there is an atom of size qx 2 (0; 1) at some point x, it must be the case
that qx [W (x+ "; x)  T (x; x)]  0 (there is no incentive to raise the bid above x) and,
if in addition x > 0; qx [L (x  "; x)  T (x; x)]  0 for small " > 0 (there is no incen-
tive to lower the bid below x). Furthermore, there can be no atom at x = 0; since
q0 [W (0 + "; 0)  T (0; 0)]  0 implies W (0; 0)   T (0; 0)  0 by the continuity of W;
contradicting W (0; 0)   T (0; 0) = V=2 > 0. For x > 0; since qx > 0 by hypothesis,
[W (x+ "; x)  T (x; x)]  0 and [L (x  "; x)  T (x; x)]  0. This implies T (x; x) =
W (x; x) = L (x; x), and furthermore, given the linearity of W and L,
T (x; x)  W (y; x) for all y  x
T (x; x)  L (y; x) for all y  x
These are exactly the conditions (8) for a pure strategy solution from Theorem 1 and hence
(x; x) must also be a pure strategy equilibrium point.
Lemma 3 Suppose a symmetric equilibrium strategy of   has an atom of size qx 2 (0; 1]
at x. Then   0,   0 and  < 0. Furthermore the atom is unique and located at
x =  V= > 0:
Proof. Follows immediately from Lemma 2 and Proposition 1.
Importantly, Lemma 3 implies that if a nondegenerate symmetric mixed-strategy equi-
librium exists, any atom (if one exists) associated with the strategy is necessarily unique
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(and given by x =  V=). Consequently, the remaining absolutely continuous part is char-
acterized by di¤erential equation (3). We will use this fact to establish when nondegenerate
symmetric mixed-strategy equilibria exist, their functional forms and the corresponding equi-
librium payo¤s. We also identify parameter congurations for which the set of nondegenerate
symmetric mixed-strategy equilibria is empty. We also use this lemma to establish:
Lemma 4 Suppose  > 0. Then in any nondegenerate symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium
of  , the lower bound of the support is m = 0.
Proof. The proof proceeds by way of contradiction. Suppose the lower bound of the support
of the equilibrium mixed-strategy is m > 0 and let qm be the size of an atom (possibly zero)
at m. Then a player who bids m earns his equilibrium payo¤ of
U = qmT (m;m) + (1  qm) (    m  EF [xjx > m])
=
qm
2
V    + qm
2
m  m  qm
2
( +  + )m  (1  qm) EF [xjx > m]
Deviating by bidding zero yields a payo¤ of
U =     qmm   (1  qm)EF [xjx > m]
The di¤erence in payo¤s is thus
U   U = qm
2
f V + (    +  + )mg+ m = m > 0
since qm > 0 implies  V = m by Lemma 3. Therefore it pays to deviate by bidding zero,
a contradiction.
We are now in a position to consider, case by case, the parameter congurations identied
in Proposition 2. We do this through a sequence of lemmas that are collected according to
the four parameter regions (R1 through R4) dening the di¤erent forms for the equilibrium
mixed strategies in equation (5), and which establish existence, uniqueness, or nonexistence
of equilibrium for parameter congurations within each case. We begin with
Case 1:    6= 0;  6= 0
Lemma 5 Suppose  = 0,  > 0 and  6= 0. Then there exists a symmetric equilibrium
if and only if either  = 0 or  < . Furthermore, this equilibrium is unique and in
nondegenerate mixed strategies as characterized in Proposition 2.
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Proof. Since  > 0, Proposition 1 implies any symmetric equilibrium must be in nondegen-
erate mixed-strategies, and by Lemma 3, there are no atoms. By Lemma 4, m = 0: Hence,
if a symmetric equilibrium exists, it necessarily has the form in equation (4) with C = 0:
F (x) = 1 

V
V + x
=
(9)
This is a well-dened distribution function; when  > 0, the upper bound of its support is
u = 1; when  < 0, it is u =  V= < 1. Since  = 0; a player cannot gain by choosing
an action w > u. Thus, for an equilibrium to exist, it is su¢ cient to show that EU < 1
and a players expected payo¤ against a rival who uses F is constant for any action in the
support of F:
The expected payo¤ when a player chooses xi = w against such a strategy is
EU (w) =
Z w
0
(v   x) dF (x) +
Z u
w
(    w   x) dF (x)
or, since this also holds at w = 0;
EU (0) =
Z u
0
(    x) dF (x)
=    
Z u
0
xdF (x)
Evidently, when  = 0; EU (0) =  , so EU (w) =   for all w 2 Support (F ) ; and F is
the unique symmetric equilibrium. Thus, suppose  6= 0:
Consider rst the case where  > 0: In this case u = 1 and the distribution in (9) has
a Pareto type fat tailand
R u
0
xdF (x) is unbounded when =   1  0 (or equivalently,
   6= 0). Thus, when  = 0,  6= 0 and 0 <   , we conclude that EU (0) is unbounded
and hence there does not exist a symmetric equilibrium. But if =  1 > 0 (or equivalently,
 >  6= 0); the relevant integral is nite and the expected payo¤ is
EU =     
Z 1
0
x

V
V + x
=
1
V + x
dx =
v + 
    (10)
Since for all w 2 [0;1), EU (w) = EU, in this case it follows that F is the unique symmetric
equilibrium.
Finally, if  < 0, then u =  V= and simple integration reveals
EU (0) = (v + ) = (   ) = EU (w)
for all w 2 [0; u], and hence F is the unique symmetric equilibrium.
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Lemma 6 Suppose  = 0,  < 0 and  > 0. Then there does not exist a symmetric
mixed-strategy equilibrium.
Proof. Since  < 0 and  > 0, Lemma 3 implies that F contains no atoms. Hence, C = 0
in equation (4) ; and thus
F (w) = 1 

V + w
V + m
 =
But note that, since  = > 0 and  > 0;

V + w
V + m
 =
> 1
for all w > m; which implies F (w)  0, a contradiction.
Lemma 7 Suppose  = 0,  < 0 and either  <  < 0 or  <  = 0: Then there exists a
continuum of nondegenerate symmetric mixed-strategy equilibria, all of which are identied
in Proposition 2. Furthermore, if  = 0,  < 0;    and  6= 0, there does not exist a
nondegenerate symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium.
Proof. By Proposition 1, a unique symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium exists at x =  V=:
By Lemma 3, in any nondegenerate symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium, there is at most
a single mass point, and this atom is located at  V=: Let q 2 [0; 1) denote the size of any
such mass point. By way of contradiction, suppose that the lower bound of the absolutely
continuous part of F is m >  V= (that is, F contains a gap). Then the expected payo¤ to
a player that bids  V= against F is
EU

V
 

= qT

V
  ;
V
 

+ (1  q)

    

V
 

  1
1  q
Z 1
m
xdF (x)

=
q
2

v    + ( + + ) V


+(1  q)

  + V

  1
1  q
Z 1
m
xdF (x)

A player that bids m >  V= against F earns an expected payo¤ of
EU(m) = q

v + 
V


+ (1  q)

    m  1
1  q
Z 1
m
xdF (x)

Recall that V = v +  and that, under the conditions stated,  =  +    . ProvidedR1
m
xdF (x) exists or  = 0, straightforward algebra reveals
EU(m)  EU

V
 

=   (1  q)

m  V 

> 0
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which is a contradiction: there can be no atom below the lower bound of the absolutely
continuous part of a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium.
We next show that under the conditions stated, m >  V= (which implies there are
no mass points) and that there exists a continuum of symmetric equilibria of the form in
Proposition 2. To see this, note that for  < 0 and  < 0; equation (3) requires that
m >  V= in order for F (w) to be a well-dened (and nondegenerate) distribution function
on an open interval above m: It follows that, when  = 0;  < 0 and  < 0, the only
candidate for a nondegenerate symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium is
F (w) = 1 

V + m
V + w
=
(11)
on [m;1);where m 2 ( V=;1) is arbitrary. The expected payo¤ when a player chooses
xi = w against F is
EU (w) =
Z w
m
(v   x) dF (x) +
Z 1
w
(    w   x) dF (x)
If =  1, R1
m
xdF (x) is unbounded due to the fat (Pareto type) tail of the distribution. In
this case, when  6= 0; EU (w) is unbounded and hence a nondegenerate symmetric mixed-
strategy equilibrium does not exist. But if  = 0, the expected payo¤ to a player that bids
w = m is EU (m) =     m, and hence for all w 2 [m;1); EU (w) = EU (m). Since
 < 0; EU (w) < EU (m) <1 for w < m; and hence it does not pay to deviate by choosing
an action below m:
When = > 1 (which implies  >  ) it follows that for all w 2 [m;1);
EU (w) = EU (m) =     m  
Z 1
m
x

V + m
V + x
=
1
V + x
dx
=
v + 
    +
m
   
Again, since  < 0; EU (w) < EU (m) < 1 for w < m; it does not pay to deviate by
choosing an action below m:
Lemma 8 Suppose  < 0;  6= ;  6= 0; and  6= 0: Then there does not exist a symmetric
equilibrium.
Proof. Since  < 0; Proposition 1 implies there does not exist a symmetric pure strategy
equilibrium, and by Lemma 3, there are no mass points in a nondegenerate symmetric
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mixed-strategy equilibrium. Since F (m) = 0; C = 0 in equation (4) ; hence, if a symmetric
mixed-strategy exists, it must be of the form
F (w) =

  
 
1 

V + m
V + w
 

!
(12)
We claim the distribution is unbounded. To see this, suppose to the contrary that u < 1:
Since F has no atoms, a player that bids u is certain to win and earn an equilibrium payo¤
of EU (u) = v   u   EF [x]. But, since  < 0, a player who deviates by bidding u0 > u
earns an expected payo¤ of EU (u0) = v   u0   EF [x] > EU (u) ; a contradiction.
If (  ) = > 0; equation (12) implies
lim
w!1
F (w) =

   6= 1
If (  ) = < 0, then
lim
w!1
F (w) = 1
Hence, regardless of the sign of (  ) =; F is not a well-dened distribution function,
a contradiction. Thus there does not exist a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium in this
case.
Lemma 9 Suppose  > 0,  < 0,  6= 0: Then there does not exist a nondegenerate sym-
metric mixed-strategy equilibrium.
Proof. If  > 0; then there are no mass points by Lemma 3. A symmetric equilibrium, if
one exists, must therefore satisfy equation (4) with C = 0:
F (w) =

  
"
1 

V + m
V + w
 

#
for w 2 (m;u)
Since (  ) = < 0 and w > m  0 for w > m; the term in square brackets is negative.
This and the fact that = (  ) > 0 implies F (w) < 0; which contradicts the assumption
that F is a well-dened distribution function.
If  < 0; Lemma 3 implies that an equilibrium mixed-strategy may have a mass point at
w =  V= (hence C  0). Hence, equation (4) implies
F (w) =

   +

C   
  

V + m
V + w
 

for w 2 (m;u) (13)
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If the distribution is unbounded, limw!1 F (w) = = (  ) < 1; a contradiction. Thus,
suppose u <1.
Suppose rst that the equilibrium distribution contains no mass point. Then the di¤er-
ential equation in equation (3) holds at u; and since F (u) = 1, we have
[V + u] f(u)  + (  ) = 0
Now, f (u)  0;  < 0;  > 0 and  < 0 implies u <  V=: Hence, the derivative of equation
(13) is
F 0 (w) =  (V + m)
 
 (V + w) 
 +
 < 0
since V + w > 0 for all w 2 [m;u] ; a contradiction.
Finally, suppose there is a mass point. We rst show the mass point must be located at
or below m: By way of contradiction, suppose there is a mass point at  V= > m: In this
case, the di¤erential equation (3) holds at m, and F (m) = 0: Hence,
[V + m] f(m)   = 0
Since f (m)  0;  < 0; and 0  m <  V=; this is a contradiction.
Since the mass point must be at  V= and m   V=; the derivative of equation (4) is
(for w > m)
F 0 (w) =


     C

(  )

V + m
V + w
 
 1
V + w
Since F 0 (w) > 0 for some w > m,
sgn (F 0 (w)) = sgn


     C

> 0 (14)
in order for F to be a well-dened distribution. Since the di¤erential equation holds at
w = u; setting F (u) = 1 implies


=

1    

C

V + m
V + u
 

The LHS is strictly negative by assumption, while the RHS is strictly positive by equation
(14) and the fact that m;u >  V= a contradiction.
Hence, there does not exist a nondegenerate mixed-strategy equilibrium.
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Lemma 10 Suppose  > 0,  > 0;  6= ; and  6= 0: Then there exists a unique symmetric
equilibrium and it is in nondegenerate mixed-strategies as identied in Proposition 2.
Proof. Since  > 0; Lemma 3 implies there are no mass points, and Lemma 4 implies
m = 0: Hence equation (4) implies
F (w) =

  
"
1 

V
V + w
 

#
(15)
It is straightforward to show that, for all  > 0,  > 0;  6= ;and  6= 0; this a well-dened
distribution function on [0; u] ; where
u =
V

 


 
 
  1
!
> 0
Suppose rst that  6=  (or equivalently,  6=    ). The expected payo¤ to a player
that bids w = 0 against a rival that employs F is
EU = EU (w = 0) =     
Z u
0
xdF (x)
=
v + 
    + 

 (   )
"
1 



 
 
#
V
Hence, EU (w) = EU for all w 2 [0; u] ; and it does not pay to deviate to a w > u since
 > 0:
When  =  (or equivalently,  =  ), the expected payo¤ to a player that bids w = 0
against a rival that employs F is
EU (w = 0) =     
Z u
0
xdF (x)
=   + V

  V
2
ln


As above, since  > 0; a player cannot gain by deviating to a w > u: We conclude that F
is the unique symmetric equilibrium in this case.
Lemma 11 Suppose     6= 0;  = 0 and  6= 0: Then there does not exist a symmetric
equilibrium in nondegenerate mixed strategies.
Proof. Under the conditions stated, the solution to di¤erential equation (3) is
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F (w) = K

V + w
V + m


(16)
for some K 6= 0: By hypothesis,  6= 0: Suppose rst that  < 0. Then there is no mass
point by Lemma 3, and hence F (u) = 1 implies
u =
K 
1

V +K 
1

m  V

But since  < 0; this is a contradiction, since a player could improve his payo¤ by bidding
above u:
Suppose next that  > 0: If  > 0 then once again there is no mass point by Lemma 3.
Hence, F (w) = 0 implies w =  V=: But since  V= < 0; this is a contradiction.
Finally, suppose  > 0 and  < 0: Then
f (w) = K (V + w)
 
 (V + m) 

 
= 
F (w)
V + w
and hence w <  V=: By Lemma 3, any mass point must be above the upper bound of the
absolutely continuous part of F: Setting F (w) = 0 in equation (16) implies the lower bound
of the distribution must be  V=. But this is a contradiction, since by Lemma 3, the mass
point must be located at this point.
Case 2:  = ;  6= 0
Lemma 12 Suppose  =  > 0 and  6= 0. Then there exists a unique symmetric equilib-
rium and it is in nondegenerate mixed strategies as identied in Proposition 2.
Proof. Note rst that the conditions of the Lemma imply  6= : Since  > 0, Lemma 3
implies there are no mass points. Moreover, by Lemma 4,  > 0 implies m = 0. Hence the
di¤erential equation in (3) implies
f (w) =

V + w
(17)
which together with F (m) = 0, implies that the unique F is
F (x) =
Z x
0

V + w
dw =

    ln

V + (   )x
V

(18)
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on [0; V
 
 
exp
 
 

  1], where we have used the fact  =     under the conditions
stated. The expected payo¤ of a player that bids w = 0 is
EU (0) =
Z u
0
(    x) 
V + x
dx
=
v + 
    +

(   )2

1  e  

V
and hence EU (w) = EU (0) for all w 2 0; V
 
 
exp
 
 

  1 : Since  > 0; a player
cannot gain by bidding above the upper bound of the support.
Lemma 13 Suppose  =  < 0 and  6= 0. Then there does not exist a symmetric mixed-
strategy equilibrium.
Proof. Lemma 3 implies there are no mass points, and hence equation (17) implies that, if
an equilibrium exists, it must have the form
F (x) =
Z x
m

V + w
dw
=

    ln

V + (   )x
V + (   )m

where we have used the fact that  =     under the conditions stated. Since F (u) = 1
implies u <1; the support of F is bounded. But then F cannot be part of a Nash equilibrium
since a player can increase his expected payo¤ by bidding above u; as  < 0.
Lemma 14 Suppose  =  = 0 and  6= 0: Then there does not exist a symmetric mixed-
strategy equilibrium.
Proof. Under the conditions stated, di¤erential equation (3) implies
(V + w) f(w) = 0
which contradicts the hypothesis that there is a nondegenerate mixed-strategy.
Case 3:    6= 0;  = 0
Lemma 15 Suppose  = 0,     6= 0; and  < 0. Then there does not exist a symmetric
equilibrium.
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Proof. First, note that since  = 0, there can be no mass point by Lemma 3. Under the
conditions stated, di¤erential equation (3) implies
V f(w)  + (  )F (w) = 0
and hence the unique solution is
F (x) =

  

1  exp

   
V
(x m)

(19)
with density
f(x) =

V
exp

   
V
(x m)

If  < 0; this is not a valid density and hence an equilibrium does not exist.
Lemma 16 Suppose  = 0,    6= 0; and  > 0. Then if a symmetric equilibrium exists,
m = 0 and the distribution function is of the form in equation (19) with m = 0.
Proof. First, note that since  = 0, there can be no mass point by Lemma 3. Moreover, the
solution to the di¤erential equation takes on the form in equation (19). Since  > 0; Lemma
4 implies m = 0:
Lemma 17 Suppose  = 0,     6= 0;  > 0 and  < 0. Then there does not exist a
symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium.
Proof. By Lemma 16, under this parameter conguration F (x)  = (  ) < 1 for all
x  0. Hence, F is not a valid distribution function.
Lemma 18 Suppose  = 0,     6= 0;  > 0 and  = 0. Then there exists a unique sym-
metric equilibrium and it is in nondegenerate mixed strategies as characterized in Proposition
2.
Proof. First, note that since  = 0, there can be no mass point by Lemma 3. Using Lemma
16 and setting  = 0, yields
F (x) = 1  exp

 
V
x

on [0;1)
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Since this is an exponential distribution, with mean V=; the expected payo¤ to a player
that bids w = 0 against F is
EU (0) =     
Z 1
0
xdF (x)
=     V

and hence, EU (w) = EU (0) for all w 2 [0;1). Thus, player cannot protably deviate.
Lemma 19 Suppose  = 0,     6= 0,  > 0 and  > 0: Then there exists a unique sym-
metric equilibrium and it is in nondegenerate mixed strategies as characterized in Proposition
2.
Proof. First, note that since  = 0, there can be no mass point by Lemma 3. By Lemma
16, the distribution must have the form in equation (19) with m = 0: Since  > 0, this is a
well-dened distribution function on
h
0; V
  ln


i
regardless of the sign of    . A player
that bids w = 0 against F earns an expected payo¤ of
EU (0) =     
Z v+
  ln


0
w

v + 
e 
 
v+
wdw
=
v + 
    + 

(   )2

ln




V (20)
where we have used the fact that  = 0 implies    =    : Since  > 0, a player cannot
gain by bidding above the upper bound of the support of F .
Lemma 20 Suppose  = 0,     6= 0; and  = 0. Then there does not exist a symmetric
equilibrium.
Proof. Under the conditions stated, di¤erential equation (3) implies
V f(w)  F (w) = 0
If  < 0; we have a contradiction, so suppose  > 0. The unique solution to this di¤erential
equation is
F (w) = exp


V
w  Q

Since  = 0; Lemma 3 implies there are no mass points. This contradicts the fact that
F (w) > 0 for all w 2 [0;1). Thus, if  = 0 and  = 0; there does not exist a nondegenerate
symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium when  > 0 or  < 0.
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Case 4:    = 0;  = 0
Lemma 21 Suppose  = 0 and  =  < 0. Then there does not exist a symmetric equilib-
rium.
Proof. First, note that since  = 0, there can be no mass point by Lemma 3. Under the
conditions stated, di¤erential equation (3) implies
V f(w)   = 0
or
f (w) =

V
But since  < 0; this is not a well-dened density, a contradiction.
Lemma 22 Suppose  = 0 and  =  > 0. Then there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium
and it is in nondegenerate mixed-strategies as characterized in Proposition 2.
Proof. First, note that since  = 0, there can be no mass point by Lemma 3. Under the
conditions stated, di¤erential equation (3) implies
V f(w)   = 0
or
f (w) =

V
Furthermore, since  > 0, Lemma 4 implies that m = 0. Hence, the unique solution to the
di¤erential equation is
F (x) =
Z x
0

V
dw =

V
x on

0;
V


The expected payo¤ to a player that bids w = 0 against F is
EU (0) =      V
2
and hence, EU (w) = EU (0) for all w 2 0; V


. Since  > 0, it does not pay to bid above the
upper bound of the support, as doing so increases costs but not the probability of winning.
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Lemma 23 Suppose  = 0,  =  = 0, and  =  6= 0: Then there does not exist a
symmetric equilibrium.
Proof. First, note that since  = 0, there can be no mass point by Lemma 3. Under the
conditions stated, di¤erential equation (3) implies
V f(w) = 0
or f (w) = 0 for all w: This is a contradiction.
Taken together, the above lemmas exhaustively describe all mixed-strategy equilibria
(and nonexistence) as summarized in Proposition 2.
A3. Proof of Proposition 3
Follows directly from rening the partitions of the parameter space derived in Proposi-
tions 1 and 2.
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